

IFS Doc. No. 3121-(1)A

Exh. No. _____

FOREIGN
/MINISTRY/
Very SECRET

MINISTER
Vice-MINISTER
(Signature)

DIRECTOR OF
EUROPE AND ASIA
BUREAU (SIGNATURE)
CHIEF OF THE SECOND
SECTION (Signature)

220

(1)

Record of the Conversation between Minister TOGO
and German Ambassador OTT...

In an interview at the appointment of the Minister.

From 4.20 p.m. till 5.00 p.m. on the 30th of October.
At his official residence

Minister TOGO:

I have ordered that liaison should be established with the judicial authorities regarding the affair of Mr. Sorge and Mr. Kreuzen, about which you spoke last time.

I ordered that the measures with regard to the United States should be investigated, but I (Minister) have been too busy to hear the results. However, I hope to give you an answer as soon as possible.

With regard to the extension of the term of the Anti-Comintern Pact, I have already obtained the agreement of the parties concerned on the opening of negotiations on the extension of the term of the Pact, but I want to investigate the bearing of Article 5 of the Tri-Partite Treaty on a possible abolition of the Secret Pact attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact. I shall be much obliged if you will tell me Germany's view or your opinion on this occasion.

Ambassador OTT:

In my opinion I believe that the Anti-Comintern Pact is not affected at all by the Tri-Partite Treaty.

Minister:

I should like to talk with you on this problem at a later opportunity.

I should like to hear on this opportunity how you anticipate the European War will proceed this winter and how it will develop in the coming spring.

OTT:

I am unable to obtain any personal knowledge of Germany's military plans, but I should like to state my personal view and what I told in part to the former Minister TOYODA before as I was instructed to.

Germany's plan when it launched a major attack upon TIMOSHENKO's Army, was to destroy the greater part of the Russian Army before the arrival of the season which would increase difficulties in military activities, that is to say, Germany's expectation was that it could withdraw its main body to redispense it elsewhere and leave a part of its Army and continue mopping up the remnant of the Soviet Army with a comparatively small force.

In connection with the above-mentioned German opinion, Germany proposed to the Imperial Government that it should decide upon a war against Soviet Russia. The present military situation confirms that the said opinion was right. There seem to be some difficulties at present in reaching Moscow, but, I think, as your Excellency, the Minister, well knows, that the present weather is causing them. Before the next cold season, the advances of the German Army will make progress and Moscow will fall or be surrounded during this year.

On the southern front there are comparatively few difficulties for winter fighting so military actions will be pushed on against the Caucasus. It is of course impossible for me, the Ambassador, to know in what area the German main body will be used in the future, but there is a great possibility that attacks will be opened upon the Mediterranean Sea and Suez. The Italian Army is now comparatively inactive. But it will play a very active part in future battles in the Mediterranean Sea, while the German air forces will join in this operation from island bases. In connection with this, the Turkish problem is important. But according to my (Ambassador's) personal opinion as Turkey will remain neutral as long as possible, to the benefit of Germany, no harm will come to Germany.

I, the Ambassador, can't say whether a landing operation on the mainland of Great Britain is now being planned or not, but the war in the air and the blockade will be stepped up, utilizing the major air force evacuated from the eastern front.

The war-time economic situation of Germany is likely to be improved on account of the raw materials obtained in the Soviet Union; of course, it will require some time before the said material can be utilized, but Germany will complete the mopping-up of European Russia as soon as possible. In short, Germany will be able within this year to redispense elsewhere its main body which it is now using against the Soviet Union. It will be probably towards the Mediterranean Sea that the Germany Army will advance in the future.

In this connection, it is worth notice that the Soviet Union is transferring aeroplanes from the east to replace the ones lost in the west. Only 1500 planes are now left, as I have heard, out of the 2500 planes which it had in the east, and there are indications that 1000 planes out of the remaining ones will soon be sent to the west -- a circumstance, which reminds me of the instructions I received before from my Government to the effect that Japan's firm attitude toward the Soviet Union (especially on the Soviet-Manchoukuo border) would, indeed, improve the whole situation.

Minister:

I (the Minister) know, too, that a certain amount of military power was transferred from the Far East to European Russia and that it will also be removed in the future. With regard to the Soviet-Manchoukuo and the Manchoukuo-Outer-Mongolia frontiers, our Kwantung Army is assuming a firm attitude; I desire you to bear this point in mind. I have something more to ask you: - in case the German Army advances in the future towards the Mediterranean Sea and Suez, how will the operations against IRAN and IRAQ proceed? And if the German Army were to advance into IRAQ, is it advantageous to Germany or not to make Turkey remain neutral?

I should like to ask your opinion concerning whether or not it will be possible to cause Great Britain to surrender by blockade without carrying out a landing in England and concerning when this will occur in case it is possible to cause Great Britain to surrender?

OTT:

It is difficult from a strategical standpoint to say whether or not the Mediterranean Sea Operation will be carried out in connection with the IRAN and IRAQ Operations; the German advances into the CRIMEA Peninsula are preliminary to the South-CAUCASUS Operation. Now, in case the East Mediterranean Sea Operation is commenced, operational actions, I believe is likely to proceed not only from Africa but also from every

direction possible to Germany.

It is a very difficult question to answer when it will be possible to cause Great Britain to surrender by the blockade, but the blockade of Great Britain aims at making it difficult for transport ships to arrive and this objective is likely to be accomplished in a twofold way by another means, by preventing by means of severer air-raids on Great Britain, especially the raids on its harbors the unloading of ships which have arrived passing through the blockade. The British bottoms will become unable to supply the British requirements during this year.

It may be said that the war against the British mainland, in my opinion, coupled with attacks upon the other parts of the British Empire, will take effect. If German attacks on the Mediterranean Sea are successful, not only the effect of the blockade of Great Britain proper will be enhanced but also similar damage will be inflicted on other parts of the British Empire, for instance, her bases in the Far East, and the war with Great Britain, as a whole, will be more successful.

Minister:

Your Excellency, the Ambassador's opinion on the future of the European War is very interesting. I receive reports of the War situation from the military authorities but I should like you to inform me about the future progress of the war situation.

OTT promised to do so and at the same time stated that in some quarters it was rumored that the British Army would land on the Continent of Europe, but that this was ridiculous.

Minister:

Quite true.

Thus this interview came to a close.

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Minister:

Quite true.

Thus this interview came to a close.

大臣 署名
次官 署名

外機 宛

EXHIBIT No.

9PS Doc No. 3121-(1)A

政 臣局長 署名

第三課長 署名

東郷大臣「オ」上獨大使會談録

大臣新任、接見機會、於十月三十日午後四時
三十分より五時迄 於官邸

東郷大臣 此、前御註、ソルゲ、及、スラヴ、兩、件、ニ就
テ、ハ、司法當局ト連絡セルヲ、命、ミ、置、キ、タ、
對、米、措、置、ニ、就、テ、ハ、調、査、ヲ、命、ミ、置、ケ、ル、モ、本、大、臣、ハ、極、
テ、多、忙、ナ、リ、シ、爲、其、結、果、ヲ、用、フ、到、リ、是、ヲ、ガ、ル、モ、成、ル、
可、ク、早、ク、御、返、事、ヲ、ス、ル、事、ト、致、度、
防、共、協、定、期、間、延、長、ノ、件、ニ、就、テ、ハ、延、長、交、渉、開、始、ニ、付、
関、係、方、面、同、意、ヲ、取、付、ケ、ル、唯、防、共、協、定、秘、密、附、
屬、協、定、廢、止、ノ、場、合、三、國、條、約、第、五、條、ト、関、係、ニ、付、研、
究、シ、度、ニ、ト、考、ル、処、此、機、會、ニ、獨、則、見、解、又、貴、大、使、
御、意、見、ヲ、承、リ、得、レ、バ、甚、ニ、喜、ビ、タ、リ、

「オ」上大使 本使、見解ヨリハ防共協定ハ三國條約ニ
依、リ、何等影響ヲ受、ケ、ル、モ、ニ、非、ズ、ト、信、ズ、

大 臣 此、問、題、ニ、付、ハ、後、機、會、ニ、御、註、シ、タ、ル、事、ト
致、度、本、大、臣、ガ、此、機、會、於、ハ、歐、洲、戰、争、ハ、此、冬、如、何、
相、成、リ、又、來、春、ハ、如、何、ニ、発、展、シ、テ、行、ク、可、キ、ヤ、關、心、見、透、
等、承、リ、度、

「不」獨逸、軍、事、的、意、圖、ニ、就、テ、ハ、自、今、窺、知、得、タ、ル、
所、ナ、ル、モ、自、今、個、人、的、見、解、及、一、部、既、訓、令、ニ、由、リ、
田、前、大、臣、ニ、申、上、ケ、ル、所、ヲ、述、ベ、ル、事、ト、致、度、
「チ、モ、シ、エ、ニ、コ」軍、ニ、對、シ、大、攻、撃、ヲ、開、始、ス、ル、時、ハ、獨、逸、
ガ、採、リ、得、タ、ル、立、場、ハ、軍、事、的、行、動、ハ、固、難、ナ、ル、ト、

JPS doc No 3121--(1)A

P. 2

ベキ季節到来、前「ロシア」軍、大部令ヲ撃滅セ
ントスルニ在リタリ、即チ獨逸、其、主力ヲ他方ニ轉用
、爲引揚ゲ一部、軍ヲ殘留シ比較的少數、兵力ヲ
以テ蘇軍、残存勢力ニ対スル掃蕩工作ヲ續ク得ベ
シト豫期シ居リタルモノナリ。
右、獨逸見解ニ因連シ獨逸、帝國政府ニ対シ對蘇
戰ヲ決定セラレ度旨申入タルモノニシテ、現在、軍事的
狀態、右、見解、當リ居タルヲ確證スルモノナリ、目下
莫斯科到達ニツキ若干、困難アル様杯、如キモ之、
貴大臣ヨリ御承知ノ通り、目下、天候ニヨルモノト思考
ス次、寒期到来前獨逸軍、進撃キ、進捗シ本
年中ニ莫斯科、陥落乃至包圍實現スベシ
南方戰線、冬期戰闘ヲ行フニ付困難比較的少ク
「コーカサス」ニ対スル軍事行動進メラルル事トナルベシ、
今後獨逸、主力ガ何、方面ニ用ヒラルルヤニ就テハ素
ヨリ本使、知リ得ガル所ナルモ地中海「スエズ」攻略開始
セラルル可能性大ナリ。(以下次頁)

目下伊太利軍、比較的安靜、狀態、是、今後、地中海戰、ハ停軍大、ニ參加スル、ナリ、伊太利軍、島嶼、ニ設ケラレタル、基地ヨリ、本作戰ニ參加スル、トモ、石、國、聯、ニ耳、西、問題、集、是、本使、個人的、見解、ニ從、ハ、ス、ハ、利、益、為、可能、ニ、限リ、中、立、ヲ、守、ル、事、ト、モ、ベ、キ、以、テ、想、ス、リ、有、言、ス、ル、事、ナシ

又、本、主、對、元、上、陸、作、戰、ヲ、企、圖、シ、居、ル、事、モ、ナシ、就、ハ、本、使、之、モ、得、見、ル、所、ニ、モ、東、部、戰、線、ヨリ、引、上、ゲ、兄、大、部、ノ、空、軍、ヲ、活、用、シ、テ、空、中、戰、封、鎖、戰、ヲ、激、化、ス、ル、事、ト、モ、ベ、シ

伊太利、戰、時、經、済、情、況、ハ、蘇、聯、於、テ、獲、得、セ、ル、原、料、ヨリ、良、好、化、ス、ル、事、ト、モ、ベ、シ、尤、モ、石、原、料、ヲ、利、用、シ、得、ル、事、ハ、若、干、ノ、時、間、ヲ、要、ス、ベ、キ、モ、伊太利、ハ、可、及、的、速、ニ、政、略、清、掃、工、作、ヲ、遂、ゲ、ベ、シ、要、ス、ル、伊太利、ハ、本、年、中、ニ、於、テ、目、下、蘇、聯、ニ、對、シ、用、ヒ、リ、テ、軍、主、力、ヲ、他、ニ、轉、用、シ、得、ル、事、到、ル、可、ク、今、後、伊太利、海、軍、造、艦、方、向、ハ、地、中、海、ト、モ、ベ、シ

石、國、保、ニ、於、テ、主、目、ス、ベ、キ、ハ、蘇、聯、ハ、目、下、西、方、ニ、決、シ、テ、飛、行、機、ヲ、補、填、ス、ル、為、東、方、ヨリ、移、シ、ツ、テ、ス、ル、事、ニ、本、使、ノ、聞、キ、タ、ル、所、ニ、依、リ、東、方、ニ、有、シ、居、ル、二、千、五、百、名、ノ、内、目、下、二、千、五、百、名、ヲ、殘、シ、居、ル、ミ、ニ、テ、内、千、名、モ、其、ノ、内、西、方、ニ、送、レ、ル、事、ト、モ、模、樣、ナリ、本、使、ハ、以、前、本、國、政、府、ヨリ、受、ケ、タ、ル、日、本、ノ、強、キ、對、

IPS Doc No 3121-61A

P.4

蘇俄(蘇聯蘇俄國境)より全勢力、
好戦を云ふ云々、訓令を起す。又將
或程度兵力が極まり、攻路を窮せしむ。及將
本を遂げしむるに本大臣を承知し所より、滿
蘇國境及滿外蒙國境二國より、我が國東軍
に毅然と態度を強う居るに付此意は承知置
願度前同様に致度、独軍が今後地中海
に出入りし(進出)場合、如何に作
戦(如何に戦)を又強軍(又強軍)とせしむるにせ
ば中止し、維持せしむるに独逸(獨逸)より有利とす
る。又、上陸を未だ行はず、鎮守(鎮守)より英國を屈服せ
しを得ず、又屈服せしむるに場合、如何に機(機)何時
頃(頃)にせよ、三付貴使(貴使)市(市)者(者)同(同)度
也。地中海(地中海)戦(戦)が如何に(如何に)作戦(作戦)とす
行(行)はしむるに、軍事(軍事)的(的)に難(難)き所(所)より独軍、
より、又、本(本)の進出(進出)に、如何に(如何に)作戦(作戦)を、根
本(本)に作(作)る(る)に、抑々(抑々)東地中海(東地中海)に作戦(作戦)
開始(開始)せしむる場合(場合)に於(に)て、自(自)命(命)信(信)た(た)所(所)に、終(終)に作
戦(戦)行(行)動(動)同(同)利(利)加(加)し、又(又)独逸(獨逸)より可能
と(と)然(然)る(る)方(方)向(向)より行(行)は(は)しむ(しむ)に(に)し(し)
討(討)鎮(鎮)守(守)より何時(何時)英國(英國)を屈服(屈服)せしむるに、又(又)八回
程(程)に、困難(困難)な問題(問題)と(と)なり、又(又)討(討)鎮(鎮)守(守)に(に)送(送)船(船)

、創末、困難、ラシ、目的、トシ、目的、ハ、英、空、艦、
、激、化、就、中、英、海、軍、ニ、対、テ、爆、撃、ヲ、ヨリ、テ、鎮、ヲ、破、リ、
、ヲ、到、達、シ、見、船、船、ヨリ、何、部、ヲ、捕、テ、此、處、ニ、送、建、
、成、セ、ル、ヲ、ヨリ、ル、ベ、シ、英、國、船、艦、ハ、本、年、中、ニ、英、國、
、必、要、物、資、ヲ、補、給、ヲ、不、可、能、ト、ス、ベ、シ、
、英、本、土、ニ、對、テ、戰、ハ、本、便、ノ、見、解、ニ、從、ハ、英、帝、國、
、他、ノ、部、分、ニ、對、テ、攻、撃、ト、相、俟、テ、其、ノ、効、果、ヲ、奏、ス、
、ル、モ、一、方、フ、ヘ、リ、地、中、海、ニ、於、テ、英、艦、ヲ、奏、效、
、セ、ル、英、本、土、ヲ、鎮、効、果、ヲ、期、ス、
、國、ノ、他、ノ、部、分、例、ニ、從、東、亞、ニ、於、テ、英、艦、ヲ、同、
、様、ノ、獲、得、ヲ、家、ル、ヲ、期、ス、對、英、艦、ハ、在、條、ト、シ、其、
、効、果、ヲ、高、ル、ヲ、期、ス、ル、ベ、シ、

大臣

歐洲戰局、推移ニ関スル實情、諸公極メテ

御覽ナリ

本大臣、軍部ヨリモ報告ヲ受ケリ、且、モ、今、後、共、
、戰、局、ノ、推、移、ニ、関、シ、帝、報、知、相、
、オ、
、エ、ウ、約、ス、ト、ハ、一、部、ニ、英、ノ、歐、洲、
、セ、ウ、レ、ハ、其、ノ、止、ル、矣、

大臣

全クナリ

トテ、會見ヲ終レリ

MINISTER:

As to this matter in question, later investigations have made it clear that no measures whatever towards the U.S.A. were taken by the former Foreign Minister. Although the reason thereof is not known to me, I fully understand, through your conversation of the other day, that the Germans desire to have a warning sent to the U.S.A. This matter is a question which should also be carefully considered from the point of view of the general relations between Japan and America. If Japan adopts a firm attitude, we can think of cases when the results would be more powerful than making a proposal to the U.S.A. in the form you desired, and under the present situation, it is doubtful as to what effect a simple proposal to the U.S.A. might have on the American Government. I am very doubtful as to making a proposal on this matter at once. Because of the hurried departure of Ambassador KURUSU, I only talked with him for about two hours on the merest outline of things and did not have time to discuss details, so I didn't get as far as discussing with the Ambassador this proposal. As to this matter, I think I will have some other opportunity in the future to talk it over with you in detail.

OTT:

You said just now that Japan's resolute attitude would have a great effect on the U.S.A., but, is Ambassador KURUSU's mission also of a firm nature?

MINISTER:

Not only the mission of Ambassador KURUSU, but the attitude of our Imperial Government is also resolute. Our concessions have a limit and it is absolutely impossible for me to allow them to pass this limit. However, I cannot discuss with you the details of this limit.

OTT:

I thank you for the conversation today. I hope in the future there will be points which I can further report to my Government.

MINISTER:

I also hope we can have an opportunity to talk in the future.

IPS Doc. No. 3121-(1) B

Exhibit No. _____

: TOP SECRET :
: Foreign Ministry :

: For the Director of :
: the American Bureau :
: Chief of the First Section :

Record of the Interview of Foreign Minister
TOGO and German Ambassador OTT

November 6th. From 5.50 P.M. to 6.20 P.M.
at the Foreign Ministry.

Ambassador OTT:

I have come here today to hear about the negotiations between Japan and the U.S.A. and the dispatch of Ambassador KURUSU.

Minister TOGO:

In view of the present situation, I think it is necessary to continue the Japanese-American negotiations, and in this spirit in general, the decision of the government was made. However, as to the state of the negotiations, there are some points to be studied in the development up to now. And as to the details, there are still some points not yet decided. The Japanese and the American assertions differ, and as for me, I'm not optimistic about the progress of the negotiations. I at first thought of telling you this matter after a little more lapse of time. But if allowed to just tell you of my feelings now, I think that, as regards the future of the present negotiations, it might become necessary for the Empire to further close relations with Germany and Italy.

OTT:

Has the Imperial Government's proposal to warn the U.S.A. about which I requested you the other day been included in your recent instructions to Ambassador KURUSU?

The above warning to the U.S.A. will not directly interfere with the Japanese-American negotiations, but is of such a nature as to check U.S. President Roosevelt's dangerous moves.

外機窓

9PS Doc No 3121 - (U) B

$$+ \left(\frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \ln \frac{1}{2} \right) = \ln \frac{1}{2} = -\ln 2$$

三才外篇

一、方之鄉宿致大寶奉曰六日不齊及來酒食(派還)三國

東郷大臣　本大臣、日本交渉の経緯を先づ現在に就き上
は言ふべき、概略而言、大體政府は決定するに次第あり
唯交渉の條件は三回入役來、經過三回より推討す
要る所あり又諒解二回入役未だ決定の見合なき點より
此次談判より日本双方主張二回隔たり日本大臣自身
も其成行に付觀察し居るに非ざる來大臣の本
問題三回入役より既に經過、後意方ニ御話之致儀
上者居る次第なり茲に本人事、並時々申上り
り、本交渉の前途ニ因て吾國の獨律ト時勢多ク愈
々迫一スに事、必要トハ非ズヤト、我々が有るなり

「予」此數本碑文，置諸于己，吾國故籍，若木燭以已之
人，件之合國，來攝大德，若之海，合之合國，
此之合國，

右書本經書曰：曰宋文公三十二歲時，有人之夢，上之於天，
元宋太統實，為陳十九行，動之陽之書，十九（本姓實）
（見行）

大匠 本件は信公其後譲渡ヲサシメ置キ前外相
米側ニ對シ何處指置キ取ル居置キ此等相明ナリ
其ノ理由ハ本大匠三分ニ及ビ本大匠米側ニ譲
出シ與ハシ度ナリ猶側希望ハ大般御話ニミテ
分派知ル本件ハ日本間ノ一般關係上ヨリ之等上考フ

IPS Doc No. 3121-(1)B

元 唯今貴大臣、日本、毅然、能、度、力、未、國、に、對、し、
モ、大、に、效、果、ヲ、求、メ、ラ、ル、カ、來、栖、大、使、に、使、命、を、
出、發、ス、ル、コ、ト、ナ、リ、ヤ

大臣 來、栖、大、使、に、使、命、シ、テ、ス、帝、國、政、府、に、能、心、度、に、
毅、然、と、シ、テ、未、國、に、讓、リ、シ、限、度、ヲ、示、シ、
限、度、ヲ、越、ス、ル、事、ハ、本、大、臣、ト、シ、テ、全、然、認、認、ス、ル、
ヲ、得、ス、唯、此、限、度、に、關、シ、テ、ハ、才、話、ス、ル、事、ヲ、
得、ス

P. 2

元 貴、大、臣、唯、今、御、話、ヲ、感、謝、ス、本、使、カ、今、後、本、
國、政、府、ニ、更、ニ、報、告、シ、得、ル、點、ヲ、ハ、キ、ヲ、希、望、ス

大臣 本、大、臣、モ、將、來、御、話、ヲ、ス、ル、機、會、ヲ、得、度、ト、ナ、リ、

COPY

FOREIGN MINISTRY
TOP SECRET

Summary Report of Conversation
between
Minister TOGO and German Ambassador OTT
at the Minister's Official residence,
Nov. 30th, From 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 a.m.

Japanese-American Negotiations

OTT: I should like to hear about the progress of the subsequent Japanese-American negotiations. The newspapers are actively reporting America's handing a diplomatic note to Japan, her conferences with England, China the Netherlands and Australia, and others. The other day, you hinted that in the future it might perhaps become necessary to further solidify the German-Japanese relations. I wish to report concerning the above to my home government, so that in case such necessity should arise, we may be able to avoid it being thought that a sort of cool atmosphere is created in the German-Japanese relations by the fact that Germany was not formally notified by Japan.

MINISTER: As to the Japanese-American negotiations, I have already talked it over about 3 times with you, and the progress of the negotiations in general is approaching nearer to my expectations, that is just as you quoted now from what I told you at my first conversation with you that there exists a wide difference between the assertions of Japan and the U.S.A., admitting of little hope for a successful conclusion, and that consequently it would become necessary to further solidify the cooperative relations between Japan and Germany. The Japanese Empire has maintained her firm attitude in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations which resulted in the Japanese admonition to the U.S.A. on the U.S. oppression of Germany which is just as I told you at the previous meeting.

All through the Japanese-American negotiations we have maintained the aforementioned attitude. However, on the 26th, the U.S.A. presented a new proposal. In this proposal, the difference of opinions between Japan and the U.S.A. is great, among which the China problem is one example. But the greatest difficulty is that the U.S.A. have presented a plan to eviscerate the problem of the Tripartite Pact which had been a pending question up to the present. They also proposed that Japan conclude a non-aggression pact with Britain, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and others, and a plan to make the fulfillment of the Tripartite Pact impossible. Thus, the American proposal regarding the Tripartite Pact is the most difficult problem in the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations as Japan had, heretofore, strictly abided by the said pact.

As to the Japanese measures towards the above U.S. proposal, it is necessary to take cautious procedures. Therefore, I cannot yet tell you anything concerning the definite measures to the above, but as for myself, I think that Japan can not accept the American proposal. Anyhow, Japan has been taking a faithful attitude towards the Tripartite Pact, even at the expense of a discontinuance of the Japanese-American negotiations, and I think that in the event of failure of Japanese-American negotiations Japan is entitled to expect a similar faithful observance of the Tripartite Pact on the part of your Government and Italy's.

OTT: According to my impression from Berlin, Germany thinks that in case either Japan or Germany enters into war against America, the other party shall accept the responsibility which would naturally arise as its result.

Moreover, in view of the present situation of Britain and the U.S.A., we cannot think that there is an intention to attack Japan, and such proposal as the non-aggression pact is, I think, a measure of self-defense on the part of Britain and the U.S.A.

MINISTER: Considerable military force of the U.S.A. is already transferred to the South Pacific, and we can not conclude that they will never attack Japan from their side. It seems to us that the aim of Great Britain and the U.S.A. is to also draw in the U.S.S.R., and by making her promise not to resort to arms with Japan, are trying to keep Japan from participating in the European War. I understand that what you just now said about other treaty Powers sharing the responsibility if Japan should enter into war against America, means that they will participate in war and share their fate with Japan. Although I think Berlin's intentions are a matter of course, I am very glad to have heard it from you today.

OTT: As to this matter, there is the question of interpretation and extension of the Tripartite Pact, and I find it advisable to communicate again with Berlin. I hope you will understand the above as my personal opinion.

MINISTER: I think we shall have another chance to talk more particularly on this matter.

IPS Doc No. 3/21-(1)C

外
寫
稿

EXHIBIT No.

東郷大臣「ホト」獨大使會談錄摘要

十一月二十日午前十二時ヨリ十二時迄 於官邸

日米交渉

「オ」 日米交渉、其、後、經過ニ関シ御伺ヒ致度新聞ニハ米、對日文書手交米、英、支、蘭、濠諸國ト、會談等盛ニ報道セラレ居リ先般貴大臣カ將來更ニ日獨關係ヲ強化スル必要ヲ見ルベシト暗示セラレタルカ其、必要ヲ見ル場合獨逸カ日本ヨリ正式ニ報告ヲ受ケ又事ニ依リ日獨關係ニ或種ノ冷却、霧圍起生シタリト考ヘラルル事ヲ避クル爲ニモ本國政府ニ報告 致度次第ナリ

大臣 日米交渉ニ就テハ既ニ二三度許リ御話セルモ其、大体、成行キハ本大臣カ亦一回貴使ト、會談、際申上ケタル所トニテ唯今貴使、引用 セラレタル通り日米兩國、意見ニハ間隔多ク成立、希望尠ク其、結果日獨兩國、協力關係ヲ更ニ緊密ニスル必要到來スベシト述ヘタル豫想ニ略、近キ來シリ帝國ハ日米交渉ニ就キ毅然タル態度ヲ持シ來リ其、結果米國、對獨壓迫ニ對スル警告トナリタル事モ此、前貴使ニ御話セル通ナリ帝國トニテハ右ニ述ヘタル如キ態度ヲ一貫シテ日米交渉ニ當リ來リタル次第ナルカ二十六日米側ヨリ新ニキ提案アリタリ其、提案中ニハ日米兩國、間隔尠カラズ 支那問題、

IPS Doc No 3121-11c

如キモ其、一例ナルカ最大、難点ハ米側ヨリ其、
從來問題トシ居タル三國條約、問題ニツギ之ヲ
骨抜スル案ヲ提出シ來ル點ナリ 日本カ
英米蘇其、他、國々ト不侵略條約ヲ締結スル
事ヲモ申出テ三國條約、實行ヲ不可能トスル
案ヲモ申出來リタルモノナリ 斯、如ク從來日本カ
三國條約ヲ堅持セル爲三國條約ニ内スル米側
提案ハ日米交渉成立、最大困難ト問題トナリ居
ル次第ナリ

右米側提案ニ對スル帝國、措置ニ就テハ慎
重ナル手續ヲトル必要ナル關係上之ニ對スル決
定的方策ニ就テハ未タ申上ケル譯ニハ行カ
サルモ自今トシテハ米側、提案ヲ受諾スル
事ハ出来スト考ヘ居ル次第ナリ

兎ニ角 帝國ハ日米交渉、中絶ヲ賭シテ
五三國條約ニ忠實ナル態度ヲ採リ來ル
ル次第ナルカ日米交渉不成立、際ハ帝國ハ
貴國及伊太利ニ對シ三國條約ニツギ
同様忠實ナル態度ヲ期待シテ可ナリ
ト考ヘ居ル次第ナリ

「オ」 本使、伯林ヨリ得居ル印象ニ依リ、獨之ハ日獨何レカ米
ト戦争ニ入ルハ最モ他國ノ富強ニ生スル責任ヲ負担
スルモノト考ヘ居ル

尚英米側現在ノ状態ニ鑑ミ日本ヲ攻撃セシトシ、意圖ニ
リトハ考ヘ、又其ノ不平等條約、亦去ル如キハ英米、自衛
手段ナリト考フ

大臣 米ノ軍力ハ既ニ南太平洋ニ相當終動シ居リ、先方ヨリ
日本ニ攻撃スル方ニ入ルハ必スモ斷ラ得ズ英米側ニ於テハ
蘇聯ヲ以テ請ヒ日本ト、間ニ戦争ニ許セサル約束ヲナサシ
メ歐洲戦争ニ日本ヲ参加セシメ下ルモノヲ目的トシ居ルニ
モト考ヘ居ル

今貴使ノスルモノ日本ヲ萬一米ト、戦争ニ入ル場合、
他ノ條約古事國ノ責任ヲ負担スルハ戦争ニ参加シ
運命ヲ共ニスル御意ニ白ト解スルモノニテ、伯林ノ意圖
ハ當然、亦ト思フモ貴使ヨリ今同ニ得欣快ニ思フ次第
ナリ

「ス」 本問題ニ就テハ三國條約ノ解釋問題、擴張問
題アリ、今ニ應ニ亦、連絡スル事然ルヘウ右ハ本使
個人ノ見解トテ解セラル度

大臣 本問題ニ就テハ更ニ詳細御話ヲスル機會アリ
考フ

Doc. No. 3121-(2)-A

THE TALK BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER TOGO
AND GERMAN AMBASSADOR OTT

From 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., on October 27 at the Foreign Ministry.

1. Re prolongation of the term of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Ambassador OTT (This shall be hereinafter abridged as "O"):

I have come here today under instruction from my home government to ask the view of the Japanese Government on the prolongation of the term of the Anti-Comintern Pact that should lapse on November 25. The other day I told Chief of Bureau SAKAMOTO that the German Government wants a joint protocol to be drawn up and signed by the original signatory powers and later signatory powers and, in case the Japanese Government agrees with this, wants a joint proposal of Japan, Germany and Italy to be made towards Manchukuo, Spain and Hungary.

Minister TOGO (This shall be abridged as "Minister" in the following):

I heard the report of the Chief of Bureau on your suggestion relating to the prolongation of the term of the Anti-Comintern Pact. I have been taking part in connection with this Pact since its conclusion, and personally have a serious concern with it. As it is one of the fundamental national policies of Japan to prevent propagation of Communism, I myself do not wish the pact to terminate now but desire to prolong it. And, as to the abolition of the secret agreement, I fell in *favor of it* with ~~your~~ view. However, as a resolution of the Cabinet Conference is required before we decide on this matter, the view of our government shall be communicated to you after a decision at a cabinet conference. The government also has to refer it to the Privy Council for deliberation as an internal procedure, and for this purpose, some document drawn up jointly by Japan, Germany and Italy is needed. I shall be obliged if the German Government will submit a draft for it.

"O": As we have little time before the 27th of next month, I would like to know the decision of the Japanese government as soon as possible. I will immediately report your talk to my home government.

2. Problems affecting the United States:

"O": Several reports from the United States dealt with speeches made by KNOX and other politicians, which showed a stiffening

attitude of that country. It is also said that the Senate has revised the neutrality act. In view of such a situation, the home government instructed me to ask Your Excellency several questions. The first is whether the warning of the Japanese Government to the United States which has been promised me at the end of September is already sent or not. Former Foreign Minister TOYODA promised me at that time to send the warning to the United States in the course of the Japanese-American negotiations through Ambassador GREY or the Japanese Ambassador at WASHINGTON. In view of the fact that the crisis which developed between Germany and the United States since the end of September was increasing its tenseness and it seemed to have reached the climax, I asked repeatedly to send the said warning. The aim of Germany was to warn President Roosevelt that the offensive acts of the United States towards Germany would cause war conditions between Germany and the United States and might finally create war conditions even between Japan and the United States. Though the Japanese government agreed at that time to this proposal of the German Government, I have not heard yet that the warning towards the United States was actually sent. This is why I wish to hear from you about the matter.

In the second place, please let me know your views on the Japanese-American relations which gives us an impression that relations have become more acute.

"Minister": First, I have never heard of the warning of the Japanese Government towards the United States, so I would like to answer it after looking into the matter.

It is needless to say that Japanese-American relations imply many problems to be studied, and the state of things in the recent Japanese-American negotiations requires adequate investigation. Please understand that I am now studying those problems, and I can say nothing about Japanese-American relations especially about the Japanese-American negotiations before I finish the study.

The warning towards the United States just referred to must also be studied together with the Japanese-American relations especially the Japanese-American negotiations. Therefore I would like to have an opportunity to talk on the matter a little later.

I know the gist of what American prominent persons stated in their speeches, etc., and am informed of the revision of the neutrality act. I am well aware that German-American relations grew more and more tense. In this connection, I

want to know what attitude Germany will take towards such a situation, and I shall be happy if I could hear from your home government anything about this. Besides, if you have any opinion of your own about this matter, I shall be glad to know it for my reference.

"O": The attitude of Germany towards the United States was shown in the instruction sent by my home government in connection with the warning towards the United States. According to that, Germany believes that President Roosevelt feels it necessary to draw American public opinion towards participation in war with all his might and for this purpose availing himself of those incidents of attacks made on American ships or those hoisting the American flag, he is trying to make the American people feel that the dangers on the sea have rapidly increased. In order to prevent, by the joint efforts of Japan and Germany, this American attitude from intensifying, Germany proposes Japan's warning towards the United States. Of course, the German Navy would suppress an American attack by force, but the German Government is determined not to be tricked into playing into President Roosevelt's hands. Of late the attitude of the United States has shown itself to be bellicose by hostile acts such as revision of the Neutrality Act, arming of merchant ships, etc. I think Germany has the right to declare that President Roosevelt and his government are naturally aggressive.

"Minister": I entirely agree with you that the attitude of the United States is not only extremely questionable from a legal viewpoint but also is actual fact German-American relations have become acute and various crises have greatly increased.

I think that Germany was very wise in taking an attitude till the end of September of never being taken in by President Roosevelt's aggressive provocation. I want to know if you hold the same attitude still?

"O": From the facts Fuhrer Hitler has been so tolerant with American actions and that in his speech at the beginning of October he did not refer to the United States, I personally judge that from the German point of view Fuhrer Hitler had to do his best to the utmost limit to avert actual conflict with America. However, it is hard to say if Fuhrer Hitler can maintain this patient attitude or not when American transport ships penetrate into war areas. I believe that Germany will think that whoever comes into war areas should take his own responsibility for the result. However, whether Germany for the second time actually fights with the United States or not,

Doc No. 3121-(2)-A

a Japanese warning toward the United States might prevent the United States from taking more hostile action against Germany, and might result in prevention of war in my opinion. I think what the United States fears is operations on two fronts and the Japanese attitude should influence that of President Roosevelt.

"Minister": Your personal opinion about Germany's attitude toward the United States furnished much for my consideration. The fundamental reason which makes a Japanese warning effective to check American actions is the existence of the Japanese Navy by which we are restraining the United States and preventing President Roosevelt from achieving big movements as he wishes on the Atlantic Ocean and from participating in the war. I could presume from what you have just told me that you and the German Government are in full understanding of this point, and I appreciate this German view very highly. As to the relations between Japan, Germany and the United States, I will take into my consideration these points too.

"Q": You have just said that the resolute attitude of Japan has a great effect upon the United States, but is the mission of Ambassador KURIHARA also resolute?

"Minister": Not only the mission of Ambassador KURIHARA but also the attitude of the Japanese Government is firm. There is a limit to the concessions to be made by our government, and I, as Minister, can not assent to exceeding this limit. But I cannot tell you of the details of this limit.

"Q": I thank you for your present remarks. I hope I can have more to report to my government later.

"Minister": I also wish to have another chance to talk with you.

IPS Doc. No. 3121-(2)-A

Exh. No. _____

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 3121-(2)-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Keoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 8 pages, dated 27. Oct., 19, and described as follows: Record of Conversation between Minister TOGO and German Ambassador OTTO at the Foreign Minister. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
15th day December, 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: H. Suzuki /s/

Chief, Archives Section. SEAL
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
15th day of Dec., 1947

/s/ Henry SHIMOJIMA
NAME

Witness: J.F. Munroe /s/

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

IPS Doc. No. 3121-(2)-A

Exh. No. _____

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NAME

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Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

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P. /

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第
國 際 検 察 部 第三一二一(2) - A 號

真 誠 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、林 稔 / HAYASHI Kaoru / ハ余ガ下記ノ資格
ニ於テ、即テ日本國外務省文書課長トシテ、日本
政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官更
トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、八頁ヨリ成ル、
千九百 年 / 昭和 年 / 十月二十七日附、
下記題名、即テ外務省ニ於ケル東郷大臣及オット
／ 男 / 獨逸大使ノ會談記錄ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ
居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書
ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式
書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ
該書類又ハ引用、其他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在
ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ) 外 務 省

千九百四十七年 / 昭和二十二年 / 十二月十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官更者名稱 林 稔 / HAYASHI Kaoru /

／署名捺印／

右ノ者ノ公的資格 文書課長

證 人 鈴木 實 / H. SUZUKI /

／署名捺印／

P2.

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ヘンリイ、シモジマ / HENRY SHIMOJIMA /
ハ余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノ
ナルコト、竝ニ上記證明ハ余ガ公府上、日本政府
ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲
ニ證明ス。

千九百四十七年 / 昭和二十二年 / 十二月十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 偏 名 / HENRY SHIMOJIMA /

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際偵察部調査官

人 ジエ、エフ、マシロウ / J. F. MUNROE /

Cent.

Doc. 3121-(2)-A